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Abstract:  Brette criticizes the notion of neural coding because it seems to entail that neural 
signals need to be “decoded” by or for some receiver in the head. If that were so, then neural 
coding would indeed be homuncular (Brette calls it “dualistic”), requiring an entity to decipher 
the code. But I think Brette’s plea to think instead in terms of complex, interactive causal 
throughput is preaching to the converted. Turing (not Shannon) has already shown the way. In 
any case, the metaphor of neural coding has little to do with the symbol grounding problem.  
 
Both Shannon’s (1948) information and Turing’s (1936) computation are important in cognitive 
science. Shannon is concerned with the faithfulness of signal transmission in communication 
and Turing is concerned with what algorithms can do. Cognitive science is concerned with what 
organisms (hence their brains) can do, and how. 
 
Cells (including neurons) transmit signals. This is already true in plants (Baluska & Mancuso 
2009) and of course also in machines. And organisms certainly do things. Which of the things 
organisms do are “cognitive” and which are “vegetative” is mostly just a definitional matter, but 
it is probably overstretching the notion to say that paramecia or hearts are “cognizing.” The 
examples are nevertheless instructive for cognitive science, because paramecia, hearts and 
organisms with brains are all systems that can do things. So are computers and robots, for that 
matter. Hence finding a causal explanation of how one of them does what it does may provide 
useful lessons for explaining the others. 
 
Let’s start with the heart, an example used by Brette. What does the heart do? It pumps blood. 
No metaphors. The heart literally pumps blood, and cardiac science has successfully reverse-
engineered the heart (to a close approximation). We know how the heart does it -- and part of 
the proof that we know how is that we can apply and test our hypotheses about how the heart 
pumps blood by building a synthetic model of a heart, plugging it into the heart’s inputs and 
outputs, and testing whether it can pump blood. If it can, the artificial heart passes the “Turing 
Test” for cardiac function. 
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So what does the (human) brain (and body) pump? Human behavior. Or, rather, human 
behavioral capacity. What people can do. Let’s forget about what portion of that capacity 
counts as cognitive and what proportion is just vegetative (like cardiac function): It all consists 
of the capacity of a (living) system to do certain things. Now the challenge is to explain how.  
 
Turing (1950) provided the ground rules: You have an explanation if you can design a system 
that can do everything a human being can do, indistinguishably -- to a human -- from a human. 
If your interest is just in “cognitive” capacities, then just generate those, ignoring the vegetative 
capacities (or at least those that are not essential for generating the cognitive capacities). 
Cognition, like Justice Potter Stewart’s pornography, may be hard to define, but we know it 
when we see it. And the capacity to interact with the dynamic world of objects and events and 
their properties (including words describing those objects, events and properties) 
indistinguishably from the way humans do, is surely cognitive, if anything is. 
 
There is one more thing: Humans don’t just do: They also feel. It feels like something, to a 
human, to be seeing and doing what humans can see and do. But the capacity to feel eludes 
Turing’s program for cognitive science. It’s something our brains pump invisibly. Turing (1950) 
accordingly brackets it. But it keeps making disruptive peekaboo appearances in our attempts 
to reverse-engineer cognition, as we shall see.  
 
One of the main hypotheses about how the brain pumps cognitive capacity is via computation, 
Turing computation. Computation is the manipulation of “symbols” (arbitrary formal objects) 
on the basis of rules operating only on the symbols’ shapes (“syntax”), not their meanings 
(“semantics”), in order to generate certain symbolic outputs from certain symbolic inputs. 
That’s what algorithms do. (An intuitive example is the rule we all learned in school for 
extracting the roots of quadratic questions: “minus b plus or minus the square root of…”.)  
 
Algorithms are like recipes: apply them to the symbolic ingredients and you can explain how to 
bake a symbolic cake. Computation is very powerful; just about everything in the universe can 
be encoded symbolically and explained computationally, including cardiac function. The right 
algorithm can pump symbolic blood. And you can show that the algorithm really works by 
applying it to build a synthetic heart that really passes the cardiac Turing Test and pumps blood. 
But to do that, you have to “interpret” the symbolic code and implement it in material form, 
just as a formal recipe for a cake needs to be implemented in material form, using the real 
ingredients referred to by the symbols, in order to generate a real cake.  
 
So, despite its enormous power, computation cannot be all there is to cognition. Searle (1980) 
showed, famously (in this journal), that a computer is not cognizing even if it can pass the 
Turing Test (TT) because Searle too could pass the Chinese TT by executing the symbolic code 
without understanding a word of Chinese. Why can’t he understand? Because there is no 
connection between the symbols in the code and the objects in the world that they are 
interpretable as being about. Interpretable by whom? The user or the executor of the code. But 
the meaning itself is not in the code.  
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That is the symbol grounding problem (Harnad 2006). Simple solution: The TT must not be 
merely symbolic (verbal). It must test not only what the candidate can say, but also all the other 
things a human cognizer can do in interacting with the objects in the world that the verbal TT is 
merely chatting about. The candidate has to be a robot. And a Turing robot is not just a 
computer, manipulating formal symbols; it is a dynamical system, able to interact with the 
objects in the world. Its symbols are grounded in its capacity to identify and interact with their 
referents indistinguishably from the way we do. 
 
Now to neural “codes”:  Brette is right that it would be homuncular (although he calls it 
“dualistic”) to think of input to sensory receptors, activity along sensory pathways to sensory 
and sensorimotor regions in the brain -- and then onward to motor regions and pathways to 
motor effectors – as encoded signals being transmitted in order to be decoded by a receiver, as 
in telegraphic communication of morse code from a sender to a receiver. There is no 
homunculus on the receiving end. It’s all just a dynamic causal process constituting the 
organism’s capacity to do what it can do, some of it output in response to immediate sensory 
input, some of it generated by endogenous processes. 
 
But it is harmless to call the neural activity along sensory input pathways a “neural code.” 
Shannon’s communication theory is about the end-to-end fidelity of signal transmission (of 
analog or digital signals); it is not about cryptography, let alone about the interpretation of 
computational algorithms or of natural language. To show that there is a substantive issue 
involved here, Brette would have to show that there is a nontrivial chunk of performance 
capacity (even  the detection of interaural time difference: ITDs) that cannot be explained 
causally if we insist on calling the activity occurring along the sensory input pathways a “neural 
code.” (Brette’s preferred notion of “neural representations,” by the way, sounds just as 
homuncular to me as the idea of neural codes: “representation of what, to whom?” Ditto for 
“internal model.”) 
 
Let me close with Brette’s fleeting mention of “percepts.” This is an instance of the “peekaboo” 
influence of homuncular thinking. Psychophysics, too, can only study what the organism does 
(input/output), not whether or how it feels like something to do it. Sensorimotor activity is only 
perceptual if it is felt. I don’t doubt that it feels like something to detect an IDT, just as it feels 
like something to understand Chinese. But although symbol-grounding and Turing-testing may 
be “easy” (in principle, if not in practice), explaining how and why organisms feel rather than 
just do is and remains notoriously hard. 
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